Th is paper outlines how we may understand knowing-that as a kind of knowinghow-to, and thereby as an ability. (Contrast this form of analysis with the more commonly attempted reduction, of knowing-how-to to knowing-that.) Th e sort of ability in question has much potential complexity. In general, questioning can, but need not, be part of this complexity. However, questioning is always an element in the complexity that is philosophical knowing. Th e paper comments on the nature of this particular form of knowing.
Th e conception of knowing as being, most fundamentally, knowing-that continues to dominate epistemological analyses of knowledge. But it need not. Th is paper highlights a conceptual alternative, which is then applied to the potentially special case of philosophical knowledge. A person's skill in questioning will be seen to contribute constitutively and essentially to the nature of such knowledge.
A standard conception of knowing
Vigorous epistemological debates persist as to the nature of what it is to know that p. Vigorous, yes; but exhaustive, no: some commitments are rarely, if ever, questioned even within these debates. A few of those persisting commitments are clearly displayed in the following standard, albeit generic, picture of knowing that p, a picture that has become an epistemological refl ex:
To know that p is to be in a state of knowing that p. Most typically, this is deemed to be a state of accurately believing that p, a state possessing precise boundaries 1 and constituted in part by some further specifi c 'knowledge-making' properties. 2 For example, the belief will have been reliably formed; or it will be evidentially well supported; and so forth. Th e belief is the single 'thing' or 'substance' which is the knowledge 'within' the knower. It would be knowledge by having these further properties.
2. An epistemic diaspora Section 1's generic picture of knowing should be familiar to epistemological readers (especially Western analytic epistemologists). Even so, I wish to question a few aspects of it. If my generic counter-picture is correct, as far as it goes, 3 then there is no single 'thing within' that is the knowledge (even once appropriate further properties are present). Nor will knowing be a state, or at least not one as simple as a belief that p. 4 Nor also will knowing be the right kind of thing clearly to have precise boundaries. (So, will there be the possibility of a person's knowledge that p and her knowledge that q blurring somewhat into each other, partially overlapping? Maybe; which sounds correct to me.) Th e epistemological stakes are therefore high.
We begin carefully, then, by refl ecting on the fact that knowing that p both expresses and generates many cognitive outcomes. Accurate believing is one of these; only one, though. I will call this grouping p's epistemic diaspora. It includes something like the following listing of p-related cognitive phenomena: 5 
